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Abstract 
This paper provides an empirical explanation to the observed disparity in 
cross-border M&A inflows to developing and developed countries over 
the last two decades. We show two main results. First, the disparity can be 
attributed to the difference in the quality of institutions between the two 
groups of countries. Second, the gain from reforming institutions in 
developing countries is smaller than that in developed countries. These 
findings suggest that, with the current speed of institutional reforms in 
developing countries, the disparity is likely to persist. 
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1. Introduction 
The value of completed cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities has 
surged dramatically over the last decades from less than $100 billion in 1987 to $720 
billion in 1999.
1 This dramatic surge is driven by among others; the rapid development of 
global financial-market, the increasing international capital-mobility, and the advances in 
technology.
2  However, from a closer look at the data, one can observe that the majority of 
cross-border M&A have mainly flown to developed countries. Figure 1 shows that there is 
a substantial gap between the values of cross-border M&A inflows to developing countries 
and those to developed countries over the period of 1987-2002.
3 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
This uneven distribution of cross-border M&A inflows into these two groups of 
countries can not really be accounted for by the aforementioned driving forces behind the 
surge in cross-border M&A activities. If that had indeed been the case, one should have 
expected that, based on convergence and catching-up theories of economic growth, cross-
border M&A inflows to developing countries would have increased over time at a faster 
rate than those to developed countries. Consequently, the disparity between M&A inflows 
to those two groups of countries would have narrowed down over time. However, as Figure 
1 shows, it does not seem to be the case.   
                                            
1  See UNCTAD’s foreign direct investment database (http://www.unctad.org). 
2  Some recent studies that analyze the cross-border M&A are Evenett (2003), di-Giovanni (2005) and Rossi 
and Volpin (2005). We provide a review of these papers in section 2. 
3  We use the values of cross-border M&A inflows in the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Interactive 
Database of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) over the period of 1987-
2002. In the database, FDI is divided into two components, namely cross-border M&A and greenfield 
investment. For the purpose of our analysis, we focus on the cross-border M&A component.   3
In this paper, we show that the gap in cross-border M&A inflows to these two groups of 
countries can be attributed to the quality of their institutions. Thus, institutions are the 
source of sluggishness of cross-border M&A inflows to developing countries. We also show 
that the increase in cross-border M&A inflows resulted from an improvement in the quality 
of institutions is smaller for developing countries than for developed countries. This 
suggests that with the current speed of institutional reforms in developing countries the 
disparity is likely to persist. 
For the purpose of our analysis, we utilize three different databases. The first one is 
UNCTAD’s FDI interactive database. From this database we obtain data on the aggregate 
cross-border M&A inflows. The second one is Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi database 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2003), which provides comprehensive indices of 
institutional governance of nations that consist of; voice and accountability,  political 
stability,  government effectiveness,  regulatory quality,  rule of law, and control of 
corruption. The third one is the World Development Indicators (WDI) database that 
provides data on GDP, trade, technological improvement and financial market development. 
Our data spans the period of 1995-2002 and consists of 172 countries. In our empirical 
analysis, we employ pooled OLS estimation as our benchmark framework and also 
correlated-random-effects estimation to take advantage of the panel structure of our data.   
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a summary of the related 
literature on cross-border M&A. In this section, we also review some related papers on 
corporate governance that lend support, albeit indirectly, to our hypothesis on the positive 
link between cross-border M&A inflows and the quality of countries’ institutional   4
governance. Section 3 describes our hypothesis and methodology. Section 4 describes the 
data used in our analysis. Section 5 presents our main results and robustness tests. Section 6 
concludes our paper with some remarks.   
 
2. Related Literature 
There is a few but growing empirical literature on the determinants of cross-border M&A 
inflows and the link between cross-border M&A inflows and the quality of countries’ 
institutions. In this section, we discuss this empirical literature in order to highlight main 
differences between our paper and the existing papers and to derive a testable hypothesis on 
the link between cross-border M&A and the quality of institutions for our empirical 
analysis. 
Evenett (2003) analyzes the impact of cross-border M&A in the banking sector in 
industrialized nations on the performance of the sector. More specifically, he focuses on the 
interest-rate spreads as an indicator of performance. He shows that the impact of cross-
border M&A on performance differs significantly between EU countries and non EU 
industrialized countries. In addition to analyzing cross-border M&A in the banking sector, 
he also presents a general picture of the aggregated cross-border M&A in the world. He 
shows that the volume of cross-border M&A over the period of 1987 to 2000 differs 
markedly between developed and developing countries. Nevertheless, he does not explore 
further the possible causes for such a marked difference.   
di-Giovanni (2005) focuses on the role of financial deepening in origin countries on the 
M&A flows to host countries. In contrast to our paper that only focuses on the aggregate   5
M&A inflows to host countries, his paper focuses on bilateral M&A inflows to host 
countries. He shows that the level of financial development of origin countries, as measured 
by the stock market capitalization to GDP ratio, has a strong positive association with 
cross-border bilateral M&A. Interestingly, he further analyzes a sub-sample consisting of 
cross-border bilateral M&A flows from only developed countries to both developed and 
developing countries. Focusing on this sub-sample, he shows that the effect of the level of 
financial development of origin countries on the value of cross-border M&A is larger when 
host countries are developed countries.   
It should be noted that di-Giovanni (2005) did not evaluate the role of financial 
development of host countries, while we do that in this paper. We show that the level of 
financial development of host countries, which is a control variable in our empirical 
analysis, does not play a significant role in determining M&A inflows. On the basis of di-
Giovanni's finding, the non-significant role of the financial development of host countries 
found in our paper implies that it is not the level of financial development of host countries 
that matters, but instead the level of financial development of origin countries.   
Rossi and Volpin (2005) emphasize the role of corporate governance as determinants of 
cross-border M&A activities. Using accounting standards and shareholder protection as 
proxies for corporate governance, they show that the volume of M&A activities (both 
domestic and cross-border M&A) is significantly larger in countries whose accounting 
standards are better and shareholder protection is stronger. Focusing on the difference 
between cross-border and domestic M&A, they also show that the probability that a given 
deal is a cross-border M&A rather than a domestic M&A decreases with the quality of   6
investor protection of the target country. Our paper differs from theirs: Rather than looking 
into individual M&A transactions that are affected by firms’ specific corporate governance 
variables, we investigate aggregated M&A inflows that are affected by country-wide 
institutional governance. This allows us to focus on the observed disparity in the cross-
border M&A inflows to developing and developed countries. We believe that the role of 
broad proxies of countries’ institutions is going to be more pronounced at an aggregate 
level. 
Our hypothesis on the positive link between the quality of institutions and cross-border 
M&A inflows can be motivated using insights from the corporate governance literature. 
This literature shows a link between quality of institutions and ownership structure. 
Specifically, the extensive literature on corporate governance, which can be traced back to 
Manne (1965), shows that corporate assets could be channeled toward their best possible 
use. M&A is the instrument that facilitates these reallocations of control on corporate 
assets.
4  However, frictions such as transaction costs, information asymmetries, and agency 
conflicts can hinder these efficient transfers of control. Recent studies on corporate 
governance, which employ measures of the quality of legal and regulatory environment 
within a country as proxies for some of these frictions, show that differences in laws, 
regulation, and enforcement shape the ownership structure of firms (see, e.g., La Porta et al., 
1997, 1998, and 1999). In general, the better the institutional quality is, the more likely it is 
that widely-held ownership structure will emerge.   
The literature also shows a link between ownership structure and the emergence of 
                                            
4  See Weston, Mitchell and Mulherin (2004) for a review on various M&A theories.   7
M&A. Hart (1995) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997), for example, show that a widely-held 
ownership structure stimulates an active role of the market for corporate-control, i.e. M&A. 
Hence, one can argue that M&A should occur more often in countries with widely-held 
ownership structure.   
To summarize, the corporate governance literature reviewed above points to the 
following two implications. First, the better the institutional quality of a country is, the 
more likely it is that widely-held ownership structure will emerge in that country. Second, 
countries in which widely-held ownership-structure is common should attract more M&A 
inflows. Combining these two general implications, we can thus assert that countries with 
better quality of institutions tend to have larger inflows of cross border M&A. 
 
3. Hypothesis and Methodology 
We examine whether improving the quality of host countries’ institutions increases cross-
border M&A inflows. We also test whether, as Figure 1 seems to suggest, the stage of 
countries’ development matters. Hence, we set the following two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The quality of host countries’ institutions positively affects the cross-border 
M&A inflows. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of the quality of host countries’ institutions on the cross-border 
M&A inflows to developing countries is smaller than that to developed countries. 
   8
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where ln( & )it M A  is the logarithm of cross-border M&A inflows to country i from the 
rest of the world at time t;  it INSTITUTION  is a proxy for the quality of institutions in 
country i at time t;  i DEVELOPED  is a dummy variable that equals one for developed 
countries and zero otherwise;  it i INSTITUTION DEVELOPED ×  is the interaction term 
between the quality of institutions and the developed-countries dummy;  jit X  is the j-th 
control variable for country i at time t; and  2t PERIOD  is a time period dummy. The 
country effect  i δ  represents time-invariant country-specific unobserved factors that may 
affect ln( & )it M A .
5 The error term  it ε  is countries’ time-varying errors, which are 
assumed to be distributed independently of  i δ  and 2t PERIOD . We allow  it ε  to be 
correlated across countries and time. To address potential biases in the estimation standard 
errors, we estimate Huber/ White heteroskedastic robust- and intragroup-correlation-
adjusted standard error. 
Our primary interests are the signs of both  1 α  and 3 α . Positive  1 α  is in favor of our 
first hypothesis that quality of institutions does affect cross-border M&A inflows. Positive 
                                            
5  The country effects (
i δ ) capture macro-determinants of M&A that we assume to be time-invariant such as 
labor cost, trade deficit, exchange rate and tax. They capture any discrepancies in the country’s definition of 
cross-border M&A as well as its method of reporting. They also control for other time-invariant country’s 
specific idiosyncrasies that are difficult to measure.   9
3 α  supports our second hypothesis that the effect of the quality of institutions in 
developing countries is smaller than that in developed countries. 
We start by estimating Equation (1) using pooled ordinary least square (pooled-OLS) 
model.
6 Subsequently, to take advantage of the panel structure of our data, we estimate it 
using correlated-random-effects model. 
We choose correlated-random-effects model rather than the conventional fixed-effects 
or random-effects models for two reasons. First, the proxies for institutional quality do not 
vary that much over time. We would therefore get imprecise results should we use fixed-
effects estimation. Second, the explanatory variables are likely to be correlated with the 
country-effects i δ , and this implies random-effects estimation would give us biased results.   
Among various correlated-random-effects models, we choose Mundlak (1978)’s 
formulation for its simplicity.  Mundlak models country-effects  i δ  as a function of the 
means of the time-varying explanatory variables;   
12 ii ti t i j j i t i
j
INSTITUTION INSTITUTION DEVELOPED X δ ππ π ϕ =+× + + ∑ , 
in which  i ϕ  is independent and identically distributed. Applying the generalized least 
square estimation on Equation (1) yields an estimator which is equivalent to the fixed-
effects estimator.
7 
                                            
6 In the pooled-OLS model, we assume that the time-invariant, country-specific unobserved factors (
i δ ) are 
uncorrelated with all explanatory variables. In other words, we consider 
ii t δ ε +  as a composite error which 
is uncorrelated with all explanatory variables. 
7  Other correlated-random-effect models are presented in Chamberlain (1984), Hausman and Taylor (1981), 
Amemiya and MaCurdy (1986), Breusch, Mizon and Schmidt (1989) and Arrelano and Bover (1995). Some 
of them require richer type of variables and longer period of data.   10
4. Data 
We use three databases: UNCTAD’s FDI interactive database for the cross-border M&A 
inflows, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003) for the quality of institutions and World 
Development Indicators (WDI) for other control variables. This set of databases determines 
the number of countries we eventually include in our analysis. After eliminating countries 
whose data are not available, we end up with 172 countries over the period of 1995-2002.   
 
4.1 Cross-border Merger and Acquisitions   
Our dependant variable is cross-border M&A inflows to host countries from the rest of 
the world. Because cross-border M&A inflows are recorded at the time the transactions are 
done, they vary widely from year to year. If many M&A deals are happened to be 
concluded in a year, some countries may record unusually large cross-border M&A inflows 
in that single year. This peculiar recording method may be problematic because the actual 
payments or capital inflows may take place several years after the deals are completed. 
Therefore, to have a good measure of cross-border M&A inflows, we take the averages of 
M&A inflows over several years. More specifically, we consider two four-year periods: 
1995-1998 and 1999-2002.   
Even after taking the averages of two four-year periods, some countries have zero 
cross-border M&A inflows. Since we use the logarithm of M&A inflows in the regression, 
those zero M&A observations are problematic. To get around of this problem, we add one   11
to those averages before taking the logarithms.
8 
 
4.2 Quality of institutions 
We want to use proxies that are able to capture many dimensions of quality of 
government institutions and that are available for the largest possible set of countries. The 
first criterion is important because we want to analyze how different dimensions of quality 
of institutions affect cross-border M&A inflows. The second one is also necessary to 
strengthen the power of our hypothesis testing. For these reasons, we choose the set of 
institutional variables constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003).
9 Using a 
large number of variables measuring perceptions on institutional governance, compiled 
from 25 separate data sources constructed by 18 different organizations, they estimate six 
dimensions of institutional governance covering 199 countries and territories in 1996, 1998, 
2000 and 2002.   
These indicators are Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.  Voice and 
Accountability measures the extent of citizen participation in political election and decision 
making process as well as in keeping check and balances among government institutions. It 
includes various aspects of political process, civil liberties, political rights and the 
                                            
8 Some authors (see for example Rose, 2000) simply exclude the zero observations. When we drop the zero 
M&A observations from our sample, we find our results are quite robust (the results are available from 
authors upon requests). Others such as Eichengreen and Irwin (1995, 1997) propose adding one to each 
observation before taking the logarithm. If the value of M&A is large, the latter approach has the advantage of 
having the coefficient interpreted as semi-elasticity.   
9  These institutional variables are widely used in the literature. Examples of some recent works that use these 
institutional variables are, among others, Borrmann, Busse and Neuhaus (2006), Campante, Chor and Do 
(2006) and Rose and Spiegel (2006).   12
independence of the media. Political Stability measures the solidity of government 
institutions to political shocks, domestic violence and terrorism which directly affect the 
continuity of policies. It includes perception on the possibility of unconstitutional coup 
d'état as a result of, among others, domestic violence and terrorism. Government 
Effectiveness measures the government capacity in producing public goods as well as in 
designing and implementing sound policies. It includes the quality of the bureaucracy and 
public service provision, credibility of government’s commitment to its policies, and the 
independence of the civil service from political pressures.   
Regulatory Quality measures the quality of various government policies such as 
market-friendliness of policies. Rule of Law measures the fairness and predictability of 
rules of economic and social interaction as well as the extent of property rights protection. 
It includes perceptions on the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the 
judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Control of Corruption measures perceptions 
of corruption alleviation in which corruption is defined as the exercise of public power for 
private gains. 
Two things are noteworthy. First, almost all point estimates of these measures of quality 
of institutions range from -2.5 to 2.5; the larger the number is, the higher the quality of 
institutions will be. For the period of 1995-1998, we use the average values of each of those 
institutional variables in 1996 and 1998, and for the period of 1999-2002 we use the 
average values in 2000 and 2002. We present the descriptive statistics of these variables 
and of others in Table 1 in Appendix. Second, because these measures are highly correlated 
with each other (as can be seen from Table 2 in appendix, correlation coefficients range   13
from 0.70 to 0.96), they cannot be simultaneously included as explanatory variables in a 
regression. Therefore, we estimate several regressions; each of them uses one measure of 
the quality of institutions along with the other explanatory variables. 
Alternatively, to get an overall effect of the quality of institutions on cross-border M&A 
inflows, and yet to avoid bias due to the omission of some institutional variables from the 
regression, we develop a composite index of institutional quality comprising these 
institutional variables using the principal component analysis (PCA). We use the first 
principal component as a summary measure of the overall quality of institutions.
10 We 
experiment with several composite indices. The most comprehensive one, which uses all 
six variables, is INST6. The other is INST5 in which Political Stability is excluded for a 
reason that we will explain later. 
 
4.3 Control variables 
We use several control variables such as 1 ln( )t GDP − ,  OPENNESS,  JOURNALS, and 
MARKETCAP. We take all four variables from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
CD-ROM. As the proxy for OPENNESS, we use the ratio of volume of trade, i.e. exports 
and imports, to GDP. For JOURNALS and MARKETCAP, we use the number of journal 
articles published (per million people) and market capitalization (as a percentage of GDP), 
respectively. To address potential simultaneity problem between the size of the economy 
                                            
10  PCA is a multivariate procedure that rotates all variables such that maximum variations are projected onto 
new mutually orthogonal axes. It transforms a group of correlated variables into a set of uncorrelated 
underlying variables called principal components. These principal components are linear combinations of the 
original variables in which the first principal component, and each of subsequent ones, capture most 
variations in data.   14
and the cross-border M&A inflows, we use the average of previous four-year GDP, 
1 ln( )t GDP − , as the proxy for the size of the economy. For the other three control variables, 
we continue using their current four-year averages because apriori they do not seem to 
cause serious simultaneity problem.
11 
In the analysis we also experiment with alternative proxies for the technological 
advancement, i.e. the expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP and the number of 
patents per million people, and for the level of financial development, i.e. the ratio of M2 
and bank’s credit to GDP. 
 
4.4 Dummy variables 
To capture the possibility that explanatory variables may affect cross-border M&A 
inflows to developed- and developing countries differently, we introduce a dummy variable 
for developed countries, DEVELOPED. We follow the classification of countries’ 
development level used in the UNCTAD’s FDI Interactive Database, which is 
conventionally employed in the literature. DEVELOPED equals one for US, West 
European countries, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and some more countries; and zero 
otherwise. (See Table 3 in Appendix for a complete list of countries included in the sample 
and their status of development.)   
The developed countries dummy, DEVELOPED, would therefore capture the developed 
country specific characteristics that have not been taken into account by other explanatory 
                                            
11 We  also  use lagged openness to trade, 
1 t OPENNESS
−   and run the same set of regressions.  The  results 
are quite robust. They are available from authors upon request.   15
variables. Its interaction with the quality of institutions,  , × INSTITUTION DEVELOPED  
would allow both groups of countries to have different effects of reforming government 
institutions on cross-border M&A inflows. 
We also introduce a dummy for the second period, PERIOD2, to take into account any 
changes in factors which affect cross-border M&A across time. They are, for example, the 
world’s investment climate and the world economic growth. PERIOD2 equals one for the 
period of 1999-2002 and zero for the period of 1995-1998. 
 
5. Empirical Results   
5.1 Main Results 
Table 4 presents the results of the pooled-OLS models. (The numbers in parentheses are 
the p-values, which are computed using the panel-robust standard errors.) First we include 
1 ln( )t GDP −  and OPENNESS only as control variables (see Regressions 1-8). All six 
individual measures of the quality of institutions and the two composite indices, INST6 and 
INST5, are highly significant, thereby confirming our first hypothesis that M&A inflows 
depend on investors’ perception about the quality of the host countries’ institutions. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
The magnitude of their estimates suggests that Regulatory Quality has the strongest 
effect on M&A inflows, followed by Voice and Accountability and Government 
Effectiveness. The effects of Control of Corruption, Rule of Law and Political Stability 
appear to be less important compared to the first two measures. Control of Corruption and   16
Rule of Law, to some extent, have a weak positive effect on M&A inflows, which suggests 
that investors may continue investing in countries where corruption is prevalent and legal 
apparatus have not been fully developed like in China or Indonesia. 
The weaker effect of Political Stability on M&A inflows is rather puzzling. We expect 
that investors would be concerned with the host countries’ political stability as much as, if 
not more than, their regulatory quality. This result seems to suggest that political stability is 
a prerequisite for M&A inflows, and once a country achieves sufficient political stability, a 
further improvement in the degree of political stability tends to have little impact on M&A 
inflows. 
The interaction terms between individual proxies for institutional quality and the 
developed-countries dummy (INSTITUTION DEVELOPED × ) are in general statistically 
significant at 5% significance level, except for . × Political Stability DEVELOPED  
Therefore, overall this finding confirms our second hypothesis. More specifically, these 
results suggest that the way the quality of institutions affects M&A is structurally different 
in these two groups of countries: The effect of improving quality of institutions on cross-
border M&A inflows in a developing country is not as high as that in a developed country.   
  The insignificance of Political Stability DEVELOPED ×   seems to suggest that 
political stability affects the cross-border M&A inflows in both developed- and developing 
countries similarly. Investors are less likely to invest in countries that are politically 
unstable irrespective of their level of development. 
The interaction term between the composite index of institutional quality and the 
developed-countries dummy, 6, × INST DEVELOPED  is not significant which may be due   17
to the insignificance of Political Stability DEVELOPED × . To verify this, we exclude 
Political Stability from our composite index in the regression; thus we use 
5 INST DEVELOPED ×  instead. Regression 8 of Table 4 shows 5 INST DEVELOPED ×  is 
statistically significant. 
Control variables, ln(GDP) and OPENNESS, are all significant and their estimates are 
quite stable from one regression to another. The only exception is OPENNESS in the 
regression in which we use Regulatory Quality as a proxy for the quality of institutions. 
Probably, the insignificance of OPENNESS is due to the inclusion of some measures of 
openness to trade in Regulatory Quality.  
Then, we introduce the proxies for technological advancement and financial 
development, i.e. JOURNALS and MARKETCAP, as additional control variables (see 
Regressions 9-16 in Table 4).
12 However, we find that they are statistically insignificant. 
Their insignificance implies that, once we explicitly control for the quality of institutions in 
our regressions, the technological advancement and the level of financial development of 
the host countries are not important determinants of the cross-border M&A inflows. From 
the viewpoint of di-Giovanni (2005), the insignificant role of the host countries’ financial 
development is plausible: What really matters for cross-border M&A inflows is not the 
level of financial development of the host countries, but rather that of the origin countries.   
                                            
12  We experiment using the R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP and the number of patents per million 
people as alternative proxies for the level of technological advancement; and the ratios of M2 and bank credit 
to GDP as an alternative proxy for the level of financial development. We find that in most cases they are 
insignificant, or they make the estimation of  INSTITUTION  or  INSTITUTION DEVELOPED ×  imprecise 
due to multicollinearty. In the paper, we only report the regression results in which we use  JOURNALS  as  a 
proxy for the host countries’ level of technological advancement and  MARKETCAP  is used as a proxy for 
the host countries’ level of financial development. Other results are available from the authors upon request.   18
The time dummy, PERIOD2 is always significant in all regressions. The developed-
country dummy, DEVELOPED is significant in almost all regressions, except in regression 
2 of Table 4 in which we use Political Stability as a proxy for the quality of institutions. 
Table 5 presents the results of the correlated-random effects models (see Regressions 1-
8). Because the explanatory variables are highly correlated with their corresponding means, 
our estimations suffer from multicollinearity problem. As a result, many of the explanatory 
variables become insignificant. Our variables of interests, INSTITUTION 
andINSTITUTION DEVELOPED × , are significant only for some proxies of institutional 
quality i.e. Regulatory Quality in Regression 4, and the composite indices, INST6 and 
INST5, in Regressions 7 and 8. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
To avoid the multicollinearity problem and to better evaluate the magnitude and 
statistical significance of variables of interest, we drop the means of INSTITUTION 
andINSTITUTION DEVELOPED ×  from the regressions. Results similar to those of the 
previous pooled-OLS analysis then emerge (see Regressions 9-16 in Table 5). Except for 
Political Stability, all proxies for the institutional quality - both individual proxies and the 
composite indices - and their interaction terms with the developed-countries dummy are 
now statistically significant. If we include JOURNALS and MARKETCAP as additional 
control variables, we also find that in all specifications they remain insignificant.
13  
We interpret the results in Table 4 and 5 as follows: Holding ln(GDP) and OPENNESS 
constant at some values, the relationship between ln(M&A) and the quality of institutions is 
                                            
13  The results are available from the authors upon request.   19
kinked as shown in Figure 2. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
The vertical intercepts of the lines for the developing- and developed countries are 
respectively the estimates of  0 α  and 02 α α + . Both  0 α  and  2 α  are negative; therefore 
the vertical intercept for developed countries is smaller than that for developing countries. 
The slopes of the lines for developing- and developed countries are respectively the 
estimates of  1 α  and 13 α α + . Both  1 α  and  3 α  are positive; thus the line for developed 
countries is steeper than that for developing countries. Because almost all developing 
countries in the sample cluster at a lower range of values of the quality of institutions, while 
most developed countries cluster at a higher range of values, Figure 2 suggests that the 
relationship between ln(M&A) and the quality of institutions could be non-linear. 
All in all, our results suggest that the quality of institutions matters and the effect of 
institutional reform on cross-border M&A inflows in developing countries is smaller than 
that in developed countries. Hence, we can attribute the disparity between cross-border 
M&A inflows to developed- and developing countries to the quality of institutions in these 
two groups of countries. It implies that, with the current speed of the institutional reform in 
developing countries, a large portion of M&A would continue flowing to developed 
countries and the M&A disparity would persist for some time. 
   20
5.2 Further analysis 
We check the robustness of our results. First, we re-estimate Equation (1) using the 
two-year averages of the cross-border M&A rather than their four-year averages. In the 
pooled-OLS estimation, we find that INSTITUTION and  INSTITUTION DEVELOPED ×  
are statistically significant in all regressions, except for the regression in which we use 
Political Stability as a proxy for the institutional quality. In the correlated random-effects 
estimation in which we exclude the mean of INSTITUTION and the mean of 
, × INSTITUTION DEVELOPED  we find that all six proxies for the institutional quality 
remain statistically significant. Some interaction terms in the regressions that use Voice and 
Accountability and Control of Corruption as proxies for the institutional quality are 
insignificant. Like those in our basic results, the interaction term 
Political Stability DEVELOPED ×   is insignificant in all regressions.
14 
Second, to increase the variation of INSTITUTION over time, at the cost of less accurate 
values of M&A inflows, we experiment with regressions using only the proxies of 
institutional quality in the years of 1996 and 2002. Using this data, along with the 
corresponding two-year averages of M&A inflows and other control variables, we estimate 
the full specification of the correlated-random-effects model in which we include 
INSTITUTION,  INSTITUTION DEVELOPED × , ln(GDP),  OPENNESS, and all of their 
time averages in the regressions. We find that Voice and Accountability, Regulatory Quality, 
and Control of Corruption are statistically significant at 5% significance level, Political 
Stability  and  Rule of Law are significant at 10% significance level, and Government 
                                            
14  The results are available from authors upon request.   21
Effectiveness is significant only at 20% significance level. The interaction terms between 
proxies for the institutional quality and the developed-countries dummy are only significant 
in the regressions in which we use Government Effectiveness and Rule of Law as proxies 
for the institutional quality.
15 
Third, our regressions may suffer from simultaneity problem. We have used the lagged 
size of the economy, 1 ln( )t GDP − , in all regressions shown in Tables 4 and 5. To address 
simultaneity problem between openness to trade and cross-border M&A inflows, we also 
run the same set of regressions using the average of previous four-year of openness to trade, 
1 t OPENNESS − . We find robust estimates.
16  
Lastly, because the quality of institutions does not change much from year to year, we 
get imprecise results if we estimate Equation (1) using fixed-effects model. However, if we 
use the proxies of the quality of institutions in the earliest- and last-period only, their 
variations are sufficiently large so that the results of fixed-effect models are more 
significant statistically. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
Table 6 presents the estimates which show that our basic results are quite robust. We 
find that individual quality of institutions is statistically significant at about 10% level, 
except for Government Effectiveness which is significant at about 20% only. The 
significance of interaction terms varies: Government Effectiveness DEVELOPED × and 
, × Ruleof Law DEVELOPED are statistically significant at about 5% level; 
                                            
15  The results are available from authors upon request. 
16  The results are available from authors upon request.   22
RegulatoryQuality DEVELOPED ×   and  Controlof Corruption DEVELOPED ×  are 
significant at 20% and 25% level, respectively; and the remaining measures are not 
statistically significant. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Over the last two decades, we observe that most cross-border M&A have flown toward 
developed countries. This paper empirically examines whether the quality of government 
institutions explains this disparity and whether the quality of government institutions 
affects cross-border M&A inflows to two groups of countries - developing vs. developed 
ones differently. 
Our empirical results show that the quality of institutions does matter and the effect of 
institutional reform on cross-border M&A inflows in developing countries is smaller than 
that in developed countries. These results imply that, with the current speed of institutional 
reforms in developing countries, the disparity may likely to persist. 
We could further explore the nonlinearity of the relationship between the cross-border 
M&A and the quality of institutions. It would also be interesting to learn whether or not the 
quality of institutions affects different types of M&A differently. Borrowing the framework 
of the gravity models, we could also estimate the effect of the quality of institutions on 
‘bilateral’ cross-border M&A inflows. We leave all these analysis for future research. 
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[Figure 2: Kinked “returns on Institutional Reform]   27
Mean Std Dev Min Max #obs
Voice and Accountability -0.05 0.97 -2.17 1.65 369
Political Stability 0.01 0.94 -2.62 1.68 343
Government Effectiveness -0.01 0.95 -2.28 2.37 366
Regulatory Quality -0.01 0.94 -3.01 2.08 367
Rule of Law -0.01 0.97 -1.96 2.21 368
Control of Corruption -0.01 0.96 -1.82 2.47 366
Openness (% of Exports and Imports in GDP) 84.9 43.5 2.4 278.3 344
Journal article published (per million people) 92.8 198.0 0.0 969.9 360
Market Capitalization (% of GDP) 41.6 51.5 0.1 338.4 219  




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Voice and accountability (1) 1
Political stability (2) 0.72 1
Government effectiveness (3) 0.77 0.80 1
Regulatory quality (4) 0.79 0.70 0.87 1
Rule of law (5) 0.78 0.81 0.95 0.86 1
Control of corruption (6) 0.77 0.80 0.96 0.84 0.96 1
INST6 (7) 0.86 0.87 0.97 0.91 0.97 0.97 1
INST5 (8) 0.86 0.82 0.97 0.92 0.97 0.97 1.00 1
Developed country  (9) 0.68 0.59 0.76 0.63 0.76 0.78 0.76 0.77 1
Openness (10) 0.12 0.32 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.24 0.21 0.02 1
Journals published (11) 0.67 0.57 0.77 0.65 0.77 0.81 0.77 0.79 0.83 -0.02 1
Market capitalization (12) 0.37 0.39 0.61 0.54 0.59 0.59 0.56 0.58 0.43 0.34 0.51 1  
[Table 2: Cross-Correlation]  28
Developed               
Countries
Australia Albania Congo, Dem. Rep. Hungary Morocco South Africa
Austria Algeria Congo, Rep. India Mozambique Sri Lanka
Belgium Angola Costa Rica Indonesia Namibia Sudan
Canada Antigua and Barbuda Cote d'Ivoire Iran, Islamic Rep. Nepal Suriname
Denmark Argentina Croatia Jamaica Nicaragua Swaziland
Finland Armenia Cyprus Jordan Niger Syrian Arab Republic
France Azerbaijan Czech Republic Kazakhstan Nigeria Tajikistan
Germany Bahrain Djibouti Kenya Oman Tanzania
Greece Bangladesh Dominica Kiribati Pakistan Thailand
Iceland Barbados Dominican Republic Korea, Rep. Panama Togo
Ireland Belarus Ecuador Kuwait Papua New Guinea Tonga
Israel Belize Egypt, Arab Rep. Kyrgyz Republic Paraguay Trinidad and Tobago
Italy Benin El Salvador Lao PDR Peru Tunisia
Japan Bhutan Equatorial Guinea Latvia Philippines Turkey
Luxembourg Bolivia Eritrea Lebanon Poland Turkmenistan
Malta Bosnia and Herzegovina Estonia Lesotho Qatar Uganda
Netherlands Botswana Ethiopia Libya Romania Ukraine
New Zealand Brazil Fiji Lithuania Russian Federation United Arab Emirates
Norway Bulgaria Gabon Macao, China Rwanda Uruguay
Portugal Burkina Faso Gambia, The Macedonia, FYR Saint Kitts and Nevis Uzbekistan
Spain Burundi Georgia Madagascar Saint Lucia Vanuatu
Sweden Cambodia Ghana Malawi Saint Vincent and the GrenadinesVenezuela, RB
Switzerland Cameroon Grenada Malaysia Samoa Vietnam
United Kingdom Cape Verde Guatemala Maldives Sao Tome and Principe West Bank and Gaza
United States Central African RepublicGuinea Mali Saudi Arabia Yemen, Rep.
Chad Guinea-Bissau Mauritania Seychelles Zambia
Chile Guyana Mauritius Sierra Leone Zimbabwe
China Haiti Mexico Slovenia
Colombia Honduras Moldova Solomon Islands
Comoros Hong Kong, China Mongolia Somalia
Developing                                                                                                                                                                                         
Countries
  
[Table 3: List of Countries]   29
Dependent Variable: ln(M&A)it
ASGRLC I N S T 6 I N S T 5 ASGRLC I N S T 6 I N S T 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
INSTITUTIONit 1.186 0.596 0.924 1.363 0.637 0.605 0.509 0.567 1.038 0.227 0.428 1.430 0.007 -0.021 0.313 0.367
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.372) (0.176) (0.000) (0.984) (0.946) (0.021) (0.014)
INSTITUTIONit DEVELOPEDi 2.126 -0.187 0.861 1.451 0.863 0.685 0.292 0.355 1.357 0.121 0.911 1.188 0.779 0.653 0.323 0.432
(0.035) (0.674) (0.003) (0.000) (0.006) (0.024) (0.167) (0.011) (0.243) (0.725) (0.055) (0.025) (0.085) (0.129) (0.191) (0.079)
JOURNALSit 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.517) (0.013) (0.157) (0.418) (0.065) (0.114) (0.338) (0.565)
MARKETCAPit 0.004 0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.105) (0.295) (0.717) (0.760) (0.318) (0.326) (0.629) (0.784)
ln(GDP)it-1 1.065 1.117 0.955 0.891 0.987 1.024 1.018 0.943 1.048 1.061 1.055 1.011 1.062 1.077 1.051 1.048
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
OPENNESSit 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.004
(0.018) (0.032) (0.080) (0.177) (0.022) (0.005) (0.342) (0.210) (0.280) (0.155) (0.155) (0.569) (0.069) (0.046) (0.294) (0.264)
PERIOD2t 0.326 0.453 0.342 0.304 0.348 0.342 0.446 0.346 0.424 0.464 0.434 0.432 0.430 0.439 0.465 0.455
(0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
DEVELOPEDi -3.284 0.890 -1.191 -1.604 -0.849 -0.754 -1.484 -1.660 -2.543 -0.346 -1.563 -1.950 -1.092 -0.848 -1.601 -1.911
(0.024) (0.164) (0.003) (0.000) (0.011) (0.026) (0.069) (0.000) (0.085) (0.497) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) (0.057) (0.023) (0.004)
Constant -21.481 -22.968 -18.913 -17.345 -19.844 -20.741 -20.253 -18.494 -20.961 -21.555 -21.262 -20.111 -21.658 -22.058 -21.073 -20.991
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. observations 339 315 337 338 338 337 315 337 212 211 211 212 212 211 211 211
R
2 0.80 0.74 0.76 0.81 0.75 0.75 0.77 0.78 0.75 0.70 0.71 0.76 0.70 0.70 0.72 0.72
F-statistic 318 171 296 391 223 247 266 319 87 87 98 155 87 97 103 114
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Proxy of Institutions
Notes: (a) The numbers in parentheses are the p-values, computed using robust standard errors. (b) The shorthands for the proxy of quality of institutions: A = Voice and Accountability; S = Political Stability; G = Government
Effectiveness; R = Regulatory Quality; L = Rule of Law; C = Control of Corruption; INST6 = the first principal component of all six measures of institution; INST5 = the first principal component of all measures of institutions except
Political Stability. (c) How to read this table: Regression (1), for example, is the result of regressing ln(M&A) on Voice and Accountability, Voice and Accountability*DEVELOPED, ln(GDP), OPENNESS, PERIOD2, and DEVELOPED
using OLS.  
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Dependent Variable: ln(M&A)it
ASGRLC I N S T 6 I N S T 5 ASGRLC I N S T 6 I N S T 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
INSTITUTIONit 1.736 0.065 0.221 1.148 0.237 0.383 0.683 0.612 1.219 0.500 0.806 1.315 0.541 0.557 0.516 0.558
(0.000) (0.868) (0.610) (0.006) (0.560) (0.386) (0.007) (0.025) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000)
INSTITUTIONit DEVELOPEDi 2.338 2.305 2.892 1.535 2.119 0.066 1.603 1.593 2.141 0.122 1.055 1.479 1.026 0.689 0.403 0.435
(0.501) (0.108) (0.023) (0.055) (0.296) (0.966) (0.010) (0.041) (0.047) (0.827) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.011) (0.078) (0.003)
ln(GDP)it-1 -0.038 0.498 0.417 0.460 0.427 0.482 0.366 0.314 0.091 0.439 0.331 0.467 0.393 0.501 0.370 0.304
(0.939) (0.387) (0.458) (0.394) (0.445) (0.389) (0.522) (0.569) (0.858) (0.447) (0.555) (0.383) (0.484) (0.370) (0.517) (0.582)
OPENNESSit 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.011 -0.002 0.002 -0.006 0.002 -0.004 0.002 0.002 -0.007 0.000
(0.962) (0.820) (0.929) (0.676) (0.737) (0.760) (0.270) (0.825) (0.833) (0.548) (0.847) (0.622) (0.806) (0.788) (0.466) (0.982)
PERIOD2t 0.575 0.522 0.434 0.411 0.446 0.447 0.580 0.444 0.537 0.591 0.459 0.412 0.466 0.439 0.588 0.473
(0.000) (0.006) (0.013) (0.023) (0.011) (0.011) (0.003) (0.013) (0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.021) (0.008) (0.012) (0.002) (0.007)
DEVELOPEDi -3.220 1.034 -1.121 -1.648 -0.783 -0.768 -1.280 -1.533 -3.354 0.671 -1.304 -1.578 -0.948 -0.666 -1.900 -1.890
(0.024) (0.076) (0.004) (0.000) (0.011) (0.029) (0.109) (0.000) (0.033) (0.406) (0.003) (0.001) (0.067) (0.054) (0.040) (0.000)
Means of INSITUTIONit -0.562 0.566 0.716 0.197 0.379 0.215 -0.185 -0.060
(0.241) (0.168) (0.146) (0.667) (0.448) (0.673) (0.499) (0.841)
Means of INSTITUTIONit DEVELOPEDi -0.246 -2.626 -2.078 -0.022 -1.267 0.643 -1.350 -1.257
(0.939) (0.062) (0.129) (0.979) (0.540) (0.703) (0.025) (0.114)
Means of ln(GDP)it 1.106 0.610 0.536 0.431 0.561 0.540 0.651 0.633 0.975 0.675 0.635 0.428 0.602 0.525 0.642 0.638
(0.027) (0.295) (0.343) (0.425) (0.320) (0.336) (0.259) (0.252) (0.058) (0.249) (0.259) (0.426) (0.286) (0.351) (0.265) (0.250)
Means of OPENNESSit 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.013 0.005 0.004 0.012 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.003
(0.561) (0.457) (0.737) (0.490) (0.793) (0.710) (0.200) (0.611) (0.677) (0.222) (0.751) (0.428) (0.663) (0.638) (0.356) (0.735)
Constant -21.675 -22.762 -18.903 -17.438 -19.956 -20.779 -20.329 -18.648 -21.607 -23.050 -19.314 -17.556 -20.179 -20.899 -20.180 -18.548
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. observations 339 315 337 338 338 337 315 337 339 315 337 338 338 337 315 337
R
2  0.80 0.74 0.76 0.81 0.75 0.75 0.77 0.78 0.80 0.74 0.76 0.81 0.75 0.75 0.77 0.78
Proxy of Institutions
Notes: (a) The numbers in parentheses are the p-values, computed using panel-robust standard errors. (b) The shorthands for the proxy of quality of institutions: A = Voice & Accountability; S = Political Stability; G = Government Effectiveness; R =
Regulatory Quality; L = Rule of Law; C = Control of Corruption; INST6 = the first principal component of all six measures of institution; INST5 = the first principal component of all measures of institutions except Political Stability. (c) How to read
this table: Regression (1), for example, is the result of regressing ln(M&A) on Voice and Accountability, Voice and Accountability*DEVELOPED, ln(GDP), OPENNESS, PERIOD2, DEVELOPED, and the means of time-varying explanatory
variables using random-effects model. [




( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
INSTITUTIONit 1.503 0.464 0.594 1.104 0.606 0.851
(0.000) (0.097) (0.208) (0.001) (0.115) (0.050)
INSTITUTIONit DEVELOPEDi 1.063 0.928 1.802 0.915 2.783 1.615
(0.725) (0.409) (0.057) (0.166) (0.000) (0.229)
ln(GDP)it-1 0.553 1.038 0.685 0.718 0.913 1.001
(0.293) (0.079) (0.299) (0.212) (0.142) (0.144)
OPENNESSit 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.003
(0.697) (0.767) (0.428) (0.483) (0.515) (0.742)
PERIOD2t 0.185 0.160 0.113 0.116 0.158 0.134
(0.006) (0.051) (0.169) (0.141) (0.063) (0.158)
Constant -10.236 -21.376 -13.628 -14.097 -19.215 -20.760
(0.401) (0.122) (0.374) (0.291) (0.186) (0.197)
No. observations 332 309 328 330 315 300
R
2  0.19 0.18 0.15 0.22 0.19 0.18
Notes: (a) The numbers in parentheses are the p-values, computed using panel-robust standard errors. (b) The
shorthands for the proxy of quality of institutions: A = Voice & Accountability; S = Political Stability; G = Government
Effectiveness; R = Regulatory Quality; L = Rule of Law; C = Control of Corruption. (c) How to read this table:
Regression (1), for example, is the result of regressing ln(M&A) on Voice and Accountability, Voice and
Accountability*DEVELOPED, ln(GDP), OPENNESS, and PERIOD2 using fixed-effects model.
Proxy of Institutions
 
[Table 6: Fixed-effects model using earliest and last period data of Institution] 
 
 
 
 
 